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Computational approaches to explain how themind works have bloomed in the
last three decades. he idea that computing can explain thinking emerged in the
earlymodern period, but its impact on the philosophy and sciences of themind and
brain owes much to the groundbreaking work of Alan Turing on the foundations of
both mathematical computation theory and artiûcial intelligence (AI) (e.g. Turing,
1936; Turing, 1950). Turing’s work set the stage for the computational theory of
mind (CTM), which, classically understood, claims that thinking is a computational
process deûned over linguistically structured representations.
Championed byHilary Putnam (1967), Jerry Fodor (1975), AllenNewell andHerbert
Simon (1976), andZenon Pylyshyn (1984) among others, CTMplayed amajor role in
cognitive science from the 1960s to the 1990s. In the 1980s and 1990s, connectionism
(Rumelhart,McClelland and the PDPResearchGroup, 1986) and dynamical systems
theory (helen and Smith, 1994) began putting pressure on the classical formulation
of CTM. Since then, a growing number of cognitive scientists and philosophers have
appealed to these alternative paradigms to challenge the idea that the computations
relevant to cognition are deûned over linguistically structured representations.
Meantime, fueled by increasingly sophisticatedmachine learning techniques and
growing computer power, computers and computational modeling have become
ever more important to cognitive science. Since the turn of this century, engineering
successes in machine learning and computer science have inspired novel approaches
to themind, like deep learning, reinforcement learning, Bayesian modeling, and
other probabilistic frameworks, which straddle dichotomies that previously deûned
the debate about CTM (e.g. representationalism vs anti-representationalism, logi-
cism vs probability, and nativism vs empiricism). Recently, some researchers have
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argued that all these theories can be uniûed by thinking of themind as an embodied,
culturally situated, computational engine for prediction (Clark, 2015).
he Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind reects these historical dynam-
ics, engages with recent developments, and highlights future vistas. It provides
readers with a comprehensive, state-of-the-art treatment of the history, foundations,
challenges, applications, and prospects of computational ideas for understanding
mind, brain, and behavior.
he thirty-ûve chapters of the Handbook are organized into four sections: ‘His-
tory and future directions’, ‘Types of computing’, ‘Foundations and challenges’, and
‘Applications’. Although each chapter stands alone and provides readers with under-
standing of a speciûc aspect of the computational mind, there are several common
threads that contribute to the narrative coherence of the volume. Some of these
threads indicate a departure from past directions; others maintain aspects of the
heritage of classical ideas about computation and themind. We survey these briey
below.
An important thread that is continuous with the origin of CTM is that theorists
engage with the details of actual scientiûc practice. In the Preface to he Language
ofhought, Jerry Fodor explains that he had two reasons for addressing the question
of how themind works: ûrst, ‘the question of how themind works is profoundly
interesting, and the best psychology we have is ipso facto the best answer that is
currently available. Second, the best psychology we have is still research in progress,
and I am interested in the advancement of that research.’ (1975, p. viii). hese
two considerations also animate the contributors to this Handbook. Authors rely
on the best theories and evidence from the computational sciences to address
questions about how themind works. hey also aim to advance research in these
sciences by clarifying foundational concepts, illuminating links between apparently
diòerent ideas, and suggesting novel experiments. Authors sometimes disagree
about which scientiûc theories and evidence count as ‘the best’, but their supporting
discussion clariûes these disagreements and provides readerswith an understanding
of diòerences concerning computational approaches within scientiûc practice.
Another point of continuity with previous approaches is that many important
foundational questions about the computational mind remain largely unresolved.
Researchers with diòerent backgrounds and interests continue to wrestle with ‘clas-
sical’ questions. Several contributors to the Handbook engage with the problem
of computational implementation: What does it mean for a physical system to
implement a computation? Other contributors engage with explanatory questions
about the relationship between diòerent levels of analysis, such as, for example, the
relationship between DavidMarr’s computational, algorithmic, and implementa-
tional levels (Marr and Poggio, 1976). An important question is whether one level
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of analysis is somehow epistemically privileged when it comes to explain how the
mind works. A further set of issues centers on the notion of representation:What
kinds of representation occur in themind, and how do they ût with computational
models? Several contributors to the Handbook explore the relationship between
computation, representation, thought, and action, and how we should understand
representation in the context of an embodied and acting agent. Others take up
questions about the role of representation in computational explanation, including
the format used by representations in the computational sciences.
A ûnal point of continuity with previous treatments concerns the challenge of
scalability: How can one go from explaining a few aspects of themind under limited
circumstances to explaining the full range ofmental capacities across demanding,
ecologically realistic settings? One aspect of this challenge is associated with the so-
called ‘frame problem’. he frame problemwas originally formulated as the problem
of specifying in a logical language what does and does not change in a situation
when an event occurs (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969). his relatively specialized
problem has been taken as suggestive of amore general diõculty: accounting for
the ability of computing systems to make timely decisions on the basis of what is
relevant within an ongoing situation. Concerns about computational complexity
and tractability compound the frame problem, creating a scalability challenge. At
least sinceHerbert Simon’s (1957) work on bounded rationality, amajor question
faced by computational approaches to the mind has been: How can computing
systems with limited time,memory, attention, and computing power solve complex,
ambiguous, and pressing problems in the real world? Taking the lead from Simon
and other pioneers of AI, researchers in the computational sciences, including
authors in this Handbook, develop strategies to cut through the complexity of
computational problems and allow limited computing systems to solve complex,
real-world problems.
Despite these points of continuity, the contributions in theHandbook also present
salient points of departure from previous work on the computational mind. One
such point of departure is the plurality of approaches we currently observe in the
computational sciences. Instead of there being ‘only one game in town’ (Fodor, 1975),
there are now many computational approaches to explain how the mind works,
each of which illuminates a diòerent aspect ofmental phenomena.
he diversity of approacheswithin the computational scienceshashelped tomotivate
several epistemological andmethodological views that go under the general banner
of ‘pluralism’. According to these views, the plurality of computational approaches
we observe in the sciences is an essential feature of scientiûc inquiry into themind.
he explanatory and practical aims of studying the mind are best pursued with
the aid of many theories, models, concepts, methods, and sources of evidence
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from diòerent ûelds, including philosophy, computer science, AI, psychology, and
neuroscience. As several of the contributors to this Handbook suggest, these ûelds
are converging on a pluralistic conception of the computational foundations of the
mind that promotes fruitful exchanges on questions,methods, and results.
Pluralist views about the computational mind are reected in the progressive erosion
of dichotomies that, as noted above, have traditionally deûned the ûeld. he contri-
butions in this Handbook show that the historical roots of CTM are broad: even
at its origins, CTM did not necessitate or reect amonistic approach to themind.
Today, an increasing number of researchers realize that they do not need to pick
between Turing machines, logic, neural networks, probability calculus, and diòeren-
tial equations as ‘the’ approach to themind. Nor do they need to claim that any one
of these is ‘the’ computational approach. Instead, they are able to choose between
diverse questions, problems, and approaches that fall within the ambit of the com-
putational sciences. hey have the power to illuminate diòerent aspects ofmental
or neural phenomena. None of these approaches has themonopoly on computation.
his has led some researchers to reconceive of apparently competing approaches –
such as connectionism or dynamical systems theory – as diòerent aspects of the
computational framework rather than as non-computational alternatives.
Work in this area reects broader trends in the philosophy of science. Many contrib-
utors use ideas developed in the context of other sciences to illuminate the practice
of the computational sciences. Examples include appealing to work on explanation
and the relationship between models andmechanisms; the role of idealization in
modeling and perspectivalism about models in general; and the inuence of values
and social structures on scientiûc practice. With respect to explanation, philosoph-
ers of science have articulated various accounts emphasizing diòerent constraints
on what constitutes an explanation. One recent trend salient in this Handbook is
to think of scientiûc explanation in terms ofmechanisms andmodels rather than
in terms of laws, general principles, and encompassing theories. A turn to mech-
anisms andmodels has informed computational modeling, and raises questions
about the conditions under which a computational model has explanatory value.
Work on idealization and perspectivalism in the philosophy of science emphasizes
that the growth of scientiûc knowledge is always a situated process carried out by
interest-driven human beings interacting in social institutions and seeking to ûnd
their way in a complex world. his helps us to understand why theremight not be a
unique, universally true, computational account of themind: diòerent inquirers
may need diòerent models to answer diòerent questions.
Early computational treatments ofmindwere closely tied to traditional metaphysical
questions such as themind–body problem (What is the relationship betweenmental
states and physical states?) and semantic externalism (Does the semantic content of
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our mental states supervene on our brains and bodies alone?). In this Handbook,
thesemetaphysical debates oen take a back seat to questions about the explanatory
role of computational models in scientiûc practice.
One last point of departure from previous treatments arises from the increase in
power of computing machinery over recent years. Technological change has contrib-
uted to dramatic advances in machine learning and brain simulation. he success
ofmachine learning models is felt in the chapters. Machine learning techniques
have inspiredmodels of themind based around predictive processing, statistical
inference, deep learning, reinforcement learning, and related probabilistic notions.
hese algorithms extract statistical information from large datasets, use that in-
formation to recognize patterns,make inferences, and learn new tasks like how to
play a video game, a board game, or drive a car. A question that occupies many
contributors in this Handbook is whether, and to what extent, these techniques also
describe the workings of the human mind. While current AI excels at narrowly
deûned tasks, the problem of how to re-create human general intelligence remains
largely unsolved. General intelligence describes the ability to solvemany diverse
tasks and change goals exibly and rationally in response to contextual cues. We do
not know how humans do this. Reconstructing the process that underlies general
intelligence poses a challenge to both current machine learning and computational
models of themind.
As editors, we seehe Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind as fulûlling
threemain goals. First, we see it as a ‘time capsule’ of current trends,marking points
of departure and continuity with respect to classical computational treatments.
Since the Handbook crystallizes many of the important ideas we can identify today,
it will be a helpful resource for those researchers who will look back at the historical
trajectory of the ûeld in a couple of decades or so. Second, we see theHandbook
as informing present-day scholars and practitioners of the accomplishments and
challenges of computational approaches to themind. hird, we see theHandbook
as a pedagogical resource, appropriate for graduate and advanced undergraduate
courses in disciplines ranging from the philosophy ofmind and cognitive science,
to computational cognitive neuroscience, AI, and computer science.
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